[Blaine Hall]

Just how lethal were exchanges of musket fire in the 18th century? For example, if a unit of 50 professional soldiers fired upon another unit of 50 soldiers at 100 yards or less on open ground, how many casualties would be expected from said volley. How much difference would there be if the exchange took place at 150 yards or more? For the purpose of this question let's assume that the weapons used are smoothebore muskets and the soldiers are using "musket line" tactics
-- nobody hiding in the bushes with a Kentucky long rifle.

I apologize if this is posted to the wrong section of the forums but thank you all in advance for your imput.

[Neal Matheson]

here you go....
http://www.scotwars.com/equip_smoothbore_musketry.htm

[Lin Robinson]

[Elnathan Barnett]

Off the top of my head, I believe they did worry about aiming, but mostly in terms of elevation, trying to make sure that bullets didn't fly over the enemies' heads. "Aim for the legs" was a fairly common command, I believe.

Neal's link cites the book Firepower by Hughs that I was going to recommend.

[N Cioran]

The scotwars website has some interesting information, but also mixes in some re-enactment related problems and some statistical problems.

Overall, if memory serves correctly, 19th century studies of volley fire tend to point to a low rate of fire (2-3 shots per minute) and low accuracy (less than five percent).

The combination of the quality of the soldiers, NCOs, officers, and how familiar they are with one another is very important.

That said, accounts from the 18th century have the best units able to fire six rounds a minute. I focussed on my drill for a summer a few years back, and with a good quality reproduction Long Land pattern "Brown Bess" musket with a wooden ramrod I was able to achieve this rate of fire and hit a pie plate a 50 yards six times, so a combination of accuracy and speed can be obtained.

But then I was firing on my own time even within that window. The challenge with volley fire in a unit is that you are not firing on your own time, but someone elses. A well trained unit working with a good NCO or officer that they have built up a rapport with can match rhythms, and perform very well.

I've seen the same well trained unit go to pieces with a less capable leader, or even one they just haven't established a sense of rhythm with. A great example of this is how the leader enunciates his commands. Saying "Fire" is quite different than saying, "fiRe," or most dreaded multi-syllablic, "fiiieerrre" some seem to be able to sqeeze out.

There are some re-enactorisms there as well. Most re-enactors fire dry blank paper cartridges, and the papers are not rammed home. When fired like this musket's barrels and touch-holes can foul pretty quickly, particularly in humid weather.

However, the real deal was a greased cartridge with ball. When firing the real thing, your barrel is scraped clean every shot and the foulling is minimal even at the touch hole, which is literally blasted clean by the back pressure in the barrel. I've fired two full Rawls pouch blocks (72 rounds) of waxed ball in an afternoon, and cleanup was a breeze. To paraphrase Liberi, I'd rather fire three blocks with ball than one with blanks

The effect of the rain on muskets is also over-stated. A well cared for musket will fire quite well in the rain, even without Cuthbertson`s recommended painted canvas sock to protect the lock.

But all that said, morale is the key component. There are numerous accounts of warfare from the period where units would sidle up to a moderate range and blaze happily away into clouds of smoke at each other because that was the safest place on the battlefield.

In, "With Zeal and With Bayonets Only," Matthew Spring ressurects from primary source accounts a radically different style of warfare executed by the British in North America during the revolution. Against the green, shaky troops they faced they would charge in with the bayonet only, and often the rebels would run without even firing a shot. They did this up mountains against fortified positions taking fire, and driving their enemies from their positions.

I've personally gone up the mountain at Hubbardton the British attacked up three times. You'd have to be tough, strong, and brave as hell to pull off what they did there, and they only started firing when they got to the top.

In the end, the key thing to realize is that there is seldom and average matchup. There`s a great account somewhere of a Catholic and Protestant mercenary units meeting on the continent, and in the ensuing matchup one of them shot the other to pieces with hardly a casualty. The combination of factors which led to this are lost to us, but some of the details are probably to be found in morale, training, discipline, and leadership.

Have fun!
Cole

[Simon G.]

[Kurt Scholz]

This might interest you. It's from the Napoleonic Wars, but technology in infantry weapons isn't very different from the 18th century. http://www.napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka....tics_2.htm

Here's a nice article about the bayonet: http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/bayonet.htm

And here is a general overview about Napoleonic warfare including many things like psychology and the bayonet: http://www.napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka....tics_2.htm

There's perhaps a misconception about shooting. If you charge with a loaded weapon and shoot at a few meters away you are very likely to hit with deadly effect. For this purpose you can have some pikes or bayonets that help you to keep the enemy within a range that allows you to shoot him dead sure. The pike and the bayonet in my opinion aren't the killing part of the weaponry, they are rather the defensive part to enable close range fire.
Jacob Christoph von Grimmelshausen writes in the »Seltzamer Springsinsfeld« chapter 13 about pikemen in the 30 years war: (but I this also applies to bayonets)

A musketeer is really a poor plagued creature, but he lives in wonderful bliss compared to the wretched pikeman. It's sad to think about what adversity these poor fellows have to endure. No one would believe it, who didn't experience it himself and I'm of the opinion that he, who butchers a pikeman whom he could have spared, kills an innocent men and he could never ever justify such a manslaught; although these poor pushoxes (Schiebochsen in German) have been created to protect their brigades from the hews of the reiters in the open field, they themselves don't harm anybody and anyone who runs straight into their long spears is justly served. All in all, I've seen a lot of blood and thunder, but I rarely saw that a pikeman killed someone. (my own translation, German below)

[Lafayette C Curtis]

Morale certainly played a major part. From the various instances I've read about, the most dismal examples (close range, zero hits) tended to be cases where stationary infantry fired at enemies advancing steadily towards them. On the other hand, victorious units firing at the backs of fleeing enemies tended to score a fair number of casualties. Firefights between two stationary units got deadly mostly because of how long they lasted, which not only gave time for a great deal of lead to fly around but also made both units nice targets for the artillery.

[Kurt Scholz]

So we agree that close range made and makes shooting deadly? In 18th century warfare hitting someone in combat wasn't very likely with a musket. The possibility of close quarter combat in units with cold steel still played a fairly important role in 18th century warfare (look at the swords and sabres).

The ability of infantry to shoot large formations wasn't considered very deadly, so these close quarter attacks were launched in large units giving more protection to its members. Pikes of the Swedes and Russians were replaced by bayonets early in the 18th century in order to keep the enemy far enough away to shoot him and not feel someone else's sword blade in the head.
The French introduced lots of skirmishers and attacks of columns late in the 18th century, replacing the long thin lines of Frederick the Great. Clausewitz has an interesting observation: A unit of 2/3 the length and size of the enemy takes the same amount of casualties as the longer line in a fire exchange over the usual distance. I think that exemplifies the difficulties of shooting fellow humans with muskets.

Chasseurs, rangers, jägers and other riflemen play in a different league of accuracy and they can be reasonably expected to have shot with firearms before going into battle (however, spears, long knives, crossbows and bows were still also used in hunting). Their problem is that they need to tightly fit the ball and so take more time to ram it down when loading. These valuable men were allowed to move behind cover on the battlefield and pick their prey, often reducing the chain of command. That's one of the reason why life expectancy on the battlefield declines with rank. Looking at the social fabric the hunters in Europe were the darlings of the nobility because they kept things ready for one of their most important entertainments: the hunt or better phrased killing wild animals. So light infantry were the loyal guys who were less suspect of deserting.

Artillery developed to a high peak of efficiency compared to other weapons in the ability of causing critical casualties on the battlefield. The end of the 18th century and the revolution in France saw an interesting development with fortifications losing lots of their power to stop enemy invasions. Also artillerists are the odd ones among the officers because they can calculate, but often lack a noble birth.
Pieces in use are cannons, howitzers and mortars. There's an iinterestingdiscovery in mortar firing: You didn't have to iignitethe fuse of the shell and the primer of the mortar as well. The fire of the propellant charge did it. So firing mortars became less of an art. Another significant step is the widespread use of cheap cast iron pieces.

Sappers were always few in numbers. They could be part of every unit where destruction was their task, but in their own units they were often grouped with the artillery and built things or defended fortifications. This was also a work noblemen allowed commoners to command. You needed math and ccraftmanship totally ignoble things.

In cavalry the caracole was more or less replaced by charges with cold steel, be it with the pallash, sabre or lance, shooting pistols afterwards. Some cavalry received long range firearms for dismounted use against targets far away that couldn't be charged. Later in American Civil war this employment of cavalry was further developed into some kind of ambushes (and this was one of the things the Germans used to build upon their Kesselschlachten in WWII).
And the horse artillery was introduced that concentrated on specific spots on the battlefield and made the enemy lines ripe for assault . They could fire from quite close if they were fast and so needed less math.

On an institutional level the standing army became the general tool for waging war instead of expensive mercenaries. The idea was to have cheap guys to do the fighting, but this didn't mean an end to the employment of foreigners. Prussia was especially dreaded for impressing people from other countries. Barry Lyndon is a nice story and film on this topic.

[Lafayette C Curtis]

[Kurt Scholz]

[Benjamin H. Abbott]

[Kurt Scholz]

[John Turner]

Although a bit late for you (it's Napoleonic) the book "Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies" by Brent Nosworthy has some fantastic analysis of the use of muskets and bayonets in battle, and looks at the origin of the tactics used by the Napoleonic period (i.e 18th century, Frederick the great etc.).

Although practice was often carried out by the British army, it was recognised by many battle field commanders that the musket was not particularly effective except at very short range (50yds or less). The discipline of the british army of Wellington was particularly feared, as they were known to withhold fire until very close, then fire one volley, and followup immediately with the bayonet. French contemporary sources of the time describe the nervousness of troops having to advance against line of british soldiers, standing silent and still, waiting for the volley. This ofetn caused them to start firing early, or hesitate. Indeed, on more than one occasion, the very fact that the British withheld fire until the last possible moment has been cited as a factor in breaking up an attack before a shot was fired. (again I am at work, so not able to raid the bookshelf, but may well be in the Nosworthy book).

As for aiming, the order was often given, in british ranks at least to "level". That is all muskets should be levelled at the appropriate point for the shots to hit centre of mass of the opposing force. This took a degree of skill, and practice on the part of those controlling the fire to ensure that the level was correct for the range, and there are cases of militia units of the time often firing too high, or low, with the subsequent negligble effect on the opposition. levelling also enabled the fire to continue through the "fog of war" that the black powder volleys inevitably produced, without having to aim.

[Lafayette C Curtis]

[N Cioran]

It's also quite clear that bayonet charges did not neccessarily result in close quarters combat.

In many cases in the American revolution the rebels didn't even get off a shot at the charging Brits, the broke and ran. One anecdote in, "With Zeal and Bayonet Only," sums this well. A rebel's journal described how their bayonets were ratting off each other as the men shook with fear at the British approach. When they stopped he looked to see why and it turned out the men on either side of him had run, so he did the same...

Remember, most casualties don't occur in the actual fighting, but when the enemy routs and is chased down...

Cole

[Kurt Scholz]

[Daniel Staberg]

The caracole is not a method of firing/charging at all, it is the name of a manouver in which the horseman turns his horse on the spot either to the left or right. It could be use for a number of thing in battle, one of which was allowing a rank of horsemen who had just fired pistols or carbines to turn their horse and ride back to the rear of the formation. (Essentialy turning the rank into a file). The other method used was to wheel the entire rank of horsemen but this required more space and was hard to do in any kind of wide formation.

The Germans did not even use the word "caracole" for much of this period, instead the manuals speak of "wenden" or in the case of wheeling "Schwenken"

The supposed 30YW quote is from Grimmelshausen who is not exactly a eyewitness sources:

[Lafayette C Curtis]

[Daniel Staberg]