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Lafayette C Curtis




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PostPosted: Thu 27 Sep, 2012 1:37 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Coming back to the topic of individual encounters, in such cases I think I'm more likely to consider tactics beyond the immediate encounter itself. For example, as a horseman facing an opponent on foot, I might make a couple of probing attacks and then use the horse's mobility to bait him into chasing me around until he ran out of breath. If he wasn't taking the bait, well, so what? I can always ride away, then loop back once I was out of sight and shadow him by a parallel path until we come to a situation where he lets his guard down and I can burst out from the bushes to take him by surprise. Similarly, as the man on foot I'd probably think of finding some ground littered with bushes, scrubs, boulders, or other features that could impede the horseman's mobility enough to let me lose him in the maze and hide long enough to make him abandon the search. Then, with (a great deal of) luck, I might be able to stalk him and set an ambush later on.

Not very manly, perhaps, but then nobody has ever accused me of being a particularly manly man.
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Roderick Stacey




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PostPosted: Thu 27 Sep, 2012 2:39 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

[quote="Jaroslav Kravcak"]
Roderick Stacey wrote:
I think that quote has the sides wrong, it was English Cavalry against French Infantry.

Also at Quatre Bras, the 42nd Royal Highlanders formed square, trapping Cavalry in the middle!


He propably mentioned Garcia Hernandez.

Also, could you elabourate more on 42nd Highlanders and Quatre Bras, I have found only vague information about them being attacked by cavalry suffering considerable losses. Where could I get more information about them trapping cavalry inside of the square?




Google and many good books on 100 days campaign, Waterloo etc.
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Jaroslav Kravcak




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PostPosted: Thu 27 Sep, 2012 7:15 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

So what about the examples from 18th-19th century? Id say firepower was much more defining in decisely beating cavalry charges and causing significant casualties by squares, than bayonets. Without firepower it looks like stalemate with cavalry having initiative and time on their side. Id say battle of Dresden is good example of how infantry, even in squares would fare against enemy cavalry with no, or little means to hit them at range. And maybe they cant level them up in one charge, but as at Khushab, or Aliwal, it only takes one lucky jump, or shot to make a gap and there is huge propability of whole formation collapsing in chain reaction, even considering well drilled infantry of 19th century.

Also in smaller skirmishes, wouldnt infantry without firepower get worst of it on the whole? I just browsed some examples from loyal serviteur concerning french skirmishing with spanish during italian wars and if these account arent purely fictional, it seems on small scale, counting hundeds at most, cavalry was very usefull, much more, than in larger battles maybe. Could scale of conflict be one factor in deciding overall usefullnes of cavalry in these situations? (With small scale operation being in favour of cavalry, while larger battles being dominated by heavy infantry)

What about this quote?
Source: http://netsword.com/ubb/Forum3/HTML/000494.html

After you've broken the merchants and townsmen (who have disposable income enough to furnish themselves with a hauberk, helmet and weapons who practice twice a month) by whatever means, just make sure you stay in line with the rest of the mounted troops, and don't get caught out of formation. Let the light infantry do the clean up (read Vegetius or other military manuals). If you're caught out in the open, among infantrymen, you may soon find yourself with a spear sticking out of your horse's chest, or on your back after being knocked or dragged off your horse. According to the chronicles, a horseman among infantry is in bad need of a bunch of friends, and is in great peril.

So, find your other friends with horses and form up. If you wish to make sure they are driven from the field, and haven't prepared the proper troops to do it, ride in line and herd them off, but don't break ranks, and hope they don't form up again and stand against you like the Flemish did repeatedly against the French. You won't be able to hurt them then. Give them an escape rout and make them believe they can get away - then they will.

The Normans learned this to their peril after breaking the Saxons at Hastings, and so has every other cavalry unit that broke formation to chase footmen.


It seems to me,that this quote indicates cavalry wasnt much good even against routed enemy and it was better to use infantry instead. And it should be from someone knowledeable of the subject of medieval combat, translating and interpeteting medieval fighting techniques descriptions and lecturing on the use of these weapons, with much practice. (Though I dont know, how much would he be exposed to the opinion of someone involved in serious mounted combat reenactment)

Ive found similar quotes of some more people, who seem to be quite authorities regarding recreation of authentic combat techniques from their selected periods, who state cavalry was useless against anything but fleeing enemies, who wouldnt even think about resisting any further, unarmed, unopposing, with their backs to the rider to put it simply. One of the main reasons for this topic is to gather some more information for, or against this statements, as it cant be easily dismissed, if so many people knowledgeable about this issues agree upon it.
But from my own, mostly (or better said purely Laughing Out Loud ) theoretical research up to now (regarding recorded examples, or experiences of people involved in recreating of mounted combat), my impression is, that tighly packed formations backed up by firepower and pikes/spears server their good purpouse, as any looser order, or any disorder in ranks naturally predisposed to potential disaster for infantry, if charged by determined cavalry.
So do these people have their good point based on well balanced infomation, having analyzed arguments and examples both for and against their assumption, or do they maybe ignore quite significant evidence that goes against it and points to the fact, that things arent so clear cut as they state?
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Gary Teuscher





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PostPosted: Thu 27 Sep, 2012 10:06 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Quote:
Also Id say its generally agreed so far, that frontal attacks against determined infantry generally wouldnt lead to their defeat.
On the other hand Id say the battles, where steady infantry wreaked havoc on cavalry without many casualties mostly involved either great firepower, or severely obstructed way of retreat for horsemen and that casualties in rout itself were disproportionately higher, than in fight itself. (Id say all the famous and notoriously cited battles, like Crecy, Courtrai, or Bannockburn would fall into this cathegory)
There are battles, in which infantry resisted several charges without doing too much damage themselves only to be broken later with the asistence of firepower. (Like Falkirk)


The one huge advantage of course that cavalry had is that they could choose when to break off the attack. This is IMO why you often do not see large casualties among the heavy cavalry, at least prior to the mop up portion of a battle.

For example, at Hastings - One must assume that the cavalry in their first few charges were either losing or at best fighting even - and when outnumbered by infantry, as cavalry usually were, fighting even is not a good trade.

But at Hastings, the cavalry could withdraw, refrom, and attack again (perhaps replacing broken/lost lances). Think of the what the results at Hastings would have been if thecavalry were incapable of withdrawing. An eeasy Saxon win I would think.

But cavalry can attack, and if the results are not to their advantage, withdraw and repeat. And they will often withdraw without to severe of casualties.

Even at Flakirk - apparently few knights were lost in the initial attacks on the shiltrons, as a few knights got skewered and the rest thought the better of it and withdrew.

But this advantage that mobility gives is huge - As I said, without such mobility the results of battles would have changed.

On theother hand, if cavalry starts getting the best of infantry, it's usually a rout and slaughter, as the infantry cannot choose to break off and reform, at least not as a group tough some units may be able to get away and reform, but the main body will suffer severe casualties.
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Luka Borscak




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PostPosted: Thu 27 Sep, 2012 12:58 pm    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Exactly that. Disciplined infantry can manage a fighting retreat but can't break off contact if enemies are following them. And turning your back to an enemy is not an option on foot.
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Benjamin H. Abbott




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PostPosted: Thu 27 Sep, 2012 1:31 pm    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Lafayette C Curtis wrote:
Not entirely.


Fair enough. I can see how gunners would have some ability to resist horse in skirmishes, especially with favorable terrain. François de la Noue explicitly noted the difference between individual and massed encounters. The fact that a single gunner can shoot dead a single pikeman, he wrote, does not mean a unit of gunners would beat a unit of pikes; in fact, pikes have the advantage in large numbers. He likewise described the contest between a single man-at-arms with a lance and reiter with a pistol as uncertain, but thought squadrons of the latter had odds in the field.

On the other hand, when writing about skirmishing in small troupes - he recommend groups of three or four - Sir John Smythe was clear that gunners needed help from pikes and/or halberds to resist cavalry.
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Gary Teuscher





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PostPosted: Fri 28 Sep, 2012 9:02 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Quote:
Add to this that the man on the horse is known to be a knight, warrior, professional while the man on the ground is more or a peasant with little training... and then add that both of them KNOW what the other is and is not, and you have yourself quite a situation.


I'd have to say though that very very rarely would it be monted knight vs. peasant on foot. Most that took part in a battle were better trained with some social status as well, even the foot.
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Lafayette C Curtis




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PostPosted: Mon 01 Oct, 2012 1:41 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Jaroslav Kravcak wrote:
Also in smaller skirmishes, wouldnt infantry without firepower get worst of it on the whole? I just browsed some examples from loyal serviteur concerning french skirmishing with spanish during italian wars and if these account arent purely fictional, it seems on small scale, counting hundeds at most, cavalry was very usefull, much more, than in larger battles maybe. Could scale of conflict be one factor in deciding overall usefullnes of cavalry in these situations? (With small scale operation being in favour of cavalry, while larger battles being dominated by heavy infantry)


Cavalry has always been particularly useful in smaller encounters since their mobility means that they're more likely to be there to begin with--and to concentrate overwhelming force against a relatively small fraction of the opponent's army.

The most interesting part of this is the observation made regarding the usefulness of modern cavalry in the interwar period (between World Wars I and II). Experience from the Great War showed that large, concentrated cavalry formations were no longer very useful, but small detachments of cavalry integrated into a combined-arms team (with infantry, artillery, engineers, and perhaps even tanks) could still prove useful for fighting in areas with poor support and transportation infrastructure (where the difficulties of getting fuel and heavy ammunition to front-line armoured or mechanised units could be an issue). Recent 21st-century experience has proven the worth of these observations and some special forces and/or light infantry organisations have begun to teach some of their men horsemanship and cavalry tactics in order to take advantage of this unique property.


Quote:
What about this quote?
Source: http://netsword.com/ubb/Forum3/HTML/000494.html
(snip)
It seems to me,that this quote indicates cavalry wasnt much good even against routed enemy and it was better to use infantry instead. And it should be from someone knowledeable of the subject of medieval combat, translating and interpeteting medieval fighting techniques descriptions and lecturing on the use of these weapons, with much practice. (Though I dont know, how much would he be exposed to the opinion of someone involved in serious mounted combat reenactment)


Really? I thought what Bob was pointing out is that once your (cavalry) charge had broken your enemy, you shouldn't just break formation straight away and go chasing the enemy pell-mell; instead, you should maintain formation (or halt and reform) so that you'd be prepared to act if the enemy suddenly tries to stand and fight once more. This is common sense not only for cavalry but also for shock infantry (look at what happened to the Anglo-Saxon troops who broke formation to chase the routed Bretons on the Norman left at Hastings). An excellent example is the Crusaders at Arsuf--rather than pursuing the enemy straight out, they halted and reformed after the success of their initial charge, and in the event this caution proved useful since they eventually had to charge again to shatter the still-unbroken remnants of the Ayyubid forces.


Quote:
So do these people have their good point based on well balanced infomation, having analyzed arguments and examples both for and against their assumption, or do they maybe ignore quite significant evidence that goes against it and points to the fact, that things arent so clear cut as they state?


The thing is, real military combat is not chess. You rarely can predict what's going to happen beforehand, and you certainly can't memorise sequences a dozen moves in advance like what experienced chess players do. There are too many unexpected and unpredictable factors, and in many cases the only way to know whether a plan would work is to try it. This is why the frontal charge against infantry survived in cavalry manuals all the way down to the 20th century; when it was the only practical thing to do under the prevailing circumstances (mission, enemy, terrain, timeframe, and all that kind of stuff), the chances of success might not be all that high, but you had better try it anyway on the off-chance that it might work this time.
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Jaroslav Kravcak




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PostPosted: Mon 01 Oct, 2012 9:38 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Regarding late middle ages and rennaisance gendarmes, wasnt day to day skirmishing their most important employement on military campaign? As battles doesnt seems to be so numerous in compare to opportunities for smaller scale operations. Or would they leave it to their archers and coustiliers on most occasions and skirmishes like they are described by loyal serviteur which seem to be initiated by both sides routinely from such a description are rather to be taken as exceptions, put there for more praise of Bayard? (I remember some rather vague statement regarding napoleonic cavalry, that they were generally held away from all day to day cavalry duties, or serving as messengers even to the high ranking officers to be spared for actual engagement in battle. Could it be analogy perhaps, or was it false even in 19th century and any cavalry would perform any role, if situation demanded. Because on the other hand, it seems to me, that cavalry labelled as light could very well serve in battle against both infantry and cavalry, sometimes even better, than actual cuirassiers and other heavy cavalry)

Also I maybe put it out of contest to say that quite degrades cavalry per se, I also agree it was much more safe to stay with larger group and let oneself be isolated, even if pursuing broken enemy. Anyway regarding Hastings example, it doesnt seem to me like pursued infantry just randomly turned and fought off normans (if it refers to the malfosse incident), but rather it was an ambush in difficult terrain by still organized group of enemies.

So to put it into context, I described it like this in line with other comments Mr. Charron made in the topic on foot vs mounted combat I posted earlier, where he argues, that mounted man would be at disadvantage against someone on foot who stay his ground. Not regarding infantry in tight formation, but rather chaotic melee with resisting footmen perhaps.
Also regarding some Cristi Charrons comments on disadvantages of being mounted (like in one demonstation available on youtube) They both seem to be people studying medieval combat thoroughly, taking it from practical side, rather than by pure theorizing. So Id like to understand, how exactly are these comments meant by them. Do they imply, that mounted man was really so disadvantaged, or is it my bad understanding?
Not that I knew something about it, but in case of the horse vs foot demonstration in that youtube video it seems really awkward, rather to prove the point, with horse basically standing still. I would be particularly interested, if they crosschecked their conclusions with someone more on the other side of debate, maybe even in form of practical test, maybe Mr. Charron (or anyone else, who could be considered authority on interpreting medieval fighting techniques) duelling with someone skilled in horseback fighting, maybe even if this could be viewed somewhere.
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Gary Teuscher





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PostPosted: Mon 01 Oct, 2012 10:05 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Jaroslav Kravcak wrote:

Quote:
Also I maybe put it out of contest to say that quite degrades cavalry per se, I also agree it was much more safe to stay with larger group and let oneself be isolated, even if pursuing broken enemy. Anyway regarding Hastings example, it doesnt seem to me like pursued infantry just randomly turned and fought off normans (if it refers to the malfosse incident), but rather it was an ambush in difficult terrain by still organized group of enemies.


Whether Hastings was an intentional feigned flight or a retreat is not known. However, even if it were merely a retreat, it illustrates the advantage of cavalry over infantry in this area even better. The infantry was still in a good state morale wise, though likely lost much formation (and of course flank support) in the pursuit. The cavalry may have well retreated, not even in good order, but rallied and was able to win easily against a disorganized group of infantry.

Lafayette C Curtis wrote:

Quote:
Really? I thought what Bob was pointing out is that once your (cavalry) charge had broken your enemy, you shouldn't just break formation straight away and go chasing the enemy pell-mell; instead, you should maintain formation (or halt and reform) so that you'd be prepared to act if the enemy suddenly tries to stand and fight once more. This is common sense not only for cavalry but also for shock infantry (look at what happened to the Anglo-Saxon troops who broke formation to chase the routed Bretons on the Norman left at Hastings). An excellent example is the Crusaders at Arsuf--rather than pursuing the enemy straight out, they halted and reformed after the success of their initial charge, and in the event this caution proved useful since they eventually had to charge again to shatter the still-unbroken remnants of the Ayyubid forces.


There are both positives and negatives to pursuing a routing enemy without waiting to reform. As long as you are in contact with them, they stand almost no chance of reforming, and will take severe casualties both in the form of true casualties and also those that drop shields and weapons to get away and have their will to fight completely broken.

Of course, any remaining unrouted enemy can take adavantage of the pursuers, IF they manage to be able to get into a position to attack them. Fighting through your own routing forces to fight an overpursuing enemy is no easy task, though if lanes are set up for them to run through it may work. You have to be careful your own forces are to disordered and even possibly routed by your own routing troops passing through them.

What often happened though it battles is that both the routers and the pursuers are lost to the battle for a while. The pursuers may return to fing the field of battle has already been one by the enemy. Guagmela is one example of this, the Persian cavalry routed some troops on one of Alexanders wings (his right I believe) and pursued all the way to the Macedonian baggage camp. Ptolemy was hard pressed due to the fact of some of his troops being lost, but was able to hold. Had the Persians reformed and attacked Ptolemy's forces from the flank or the rear, the battle may have ended differently.
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Luka Borscak




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PostPosted: Mon 01 Oct, 2012 10:14 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Gary Teuscher wrote:
Jaroslav Kravcak wrote:

Quote:
Also I maybe put it out of contest to say that quite degrades cavalry per se, I also agree it was much more safe to stay with larger group and let oneself be isolated, even if pursuing broken enemy. Anyway regarding Hastings example, it doesnt seem to me like pursued infantry just randomly turned and fought off normans (if it refers to the malfosse incident), but rather it was an ambush in difficult terrain by still organized group of enemies.


Whether Hastings was an intentional feigned flight or a retreat is not known. However, even if it were merely a retreat, it illustrates the advantage of cavalry over infantry in this area even better. The infantry was still in a good state morale wise, though likely lost much formation (and of course flank support) in the pursuit. The cavalry may have well retreated, not even in good order, but rallied and was able to win easily against a disorganized group of infantry.


Jaroslav thought of a Saxon ambush and destroying of pursuing Normans after the battle, not an incident of running Bretons during the battle.
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Gary Teuscher





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PostPosted: Mon 01 Oct, 2012 11:30 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Ah, good point Luca. I misread. However, the point made is still accurate.

And as to the Saxons reforming and ambushing Norman cavalry - yes, it seemed it did happen. However, these incidents were isolated and had little bearing on the battle as a whole - it was already lost.

As a mass of formed men disintegrates into a routing mob, you will have some that stand their ground, others that just run. And if the pressure is kept up by contact with the routing enemy, they should not reform as a whole, though isolated units here and there may, as with the above Ambushes by likley Saxon Huscarls against the Normans.
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Lafayette C Curtis




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PostPosted: Mon 01 Oct, 2012 12:58 pm    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Jaroslav Kravcak wrote:
Regarding late middle ages and rennaisance gendarmes, wasnt day to day skirmishing their most important employement on military campaign?


It is, not only for the gendarmes but for pretty much all kinds of troops in a Renaissance European army. However, when a commander had some choice over which troops to deploy for such smaller encounters, he'd probably prioritise lighter cavalry (and perhaps some infantry) up front and husband his gendarmes as a reserve (or to save them from unnecessary fighting altogether if the lighter troops could handle the business on their own).


Quote:
(I remember some rather vague statement regarding napoleonic cavalry, that they were generally held away from all day to day cavalry duties, or serving as messengers even to the high ranking officers to be spared for actual engagement in battle.


The real situation was quite complex. On one hand, the different types of cavalry became more and more specialised in the late 17th and into the 19th century, to the extent that cuirassiers and other dedicated heavy cavalry (which, in most cases, excluded the rather amphibious dragoons) in some European armies were quite inefficient in duties other than forming up and charging the enemy straight on. On the other hand, some cavalry was regarded as being so poor in general that the only employment the army could find for them was as messengers (since putting them into a combat situation would have been suicidal). In other cases it was the general's fault -- his cavalry was perfectly fine in their own right but the poor bloke had no idea about how to use them, so again they ended up as messengers and parade accessories.


Quote:
Because on the other hand, it seems to me, that cavalry labelled as light could very well serve in battle against both infantry and cavalry, sometimes even better, than actual cuirassiers and other heavy cavalry)


That's the other side of the coin. Look at the British; after the mid-18th century or so, the strain on their finances was such that they couldn't afford too have many types of (over-)specialised troops, and as a result British generals demanded that all their cavalry had to be able to perform a charge like heavy cavalry. This had mixed results, of course; sometimes the versatility saved the day while in other cases it led overconfident Light Dragoons to charge an enemy they couldn't realistically break. (Remember that the British had no "Horse" for quite a long while, only "Dragoon Guards," "Heavy Dragoons," and "Light Dragoons" -- none of whom were arguably proper "dragoons" in the Continental sense.)

Continental theory had a different take: the Napoleonic (and in most cases post-Napoleonic) orthodoxy held that heavy cavalry (this time including "bastard" heavy cavalry like dragoons) were meant to charge as a solid mass in deep, closely-packed formations to shatter the enemy with the psychological (and occasionally physical) impact of their initial assault. Light cavalry, in contrast, charged in looser/shallower lines and sought to exploit the disorganisation of the melée that ensued (though not always) when two cavalry units clashed but neither flinched from the initial impact; their nimbler horses and more flexible swordsmanship would allow them to cut less mobile heavy cavalry to ribbons (or, for the armoured ones, at least bludgeon them senseless) once the momentum of the latter's initial charge was arrested. Lancers in the Polish tradition were developed as a way to combine the best of both worlds, shattering the enemy with the initial impact of the lance wielded in solid formation and following up with the melée capability of subsequent ranks armed with sabres. Of course, that was the theory. In reality the rules often got bent or broken or Lovecraftianised beyond recognition.

And the dragoons . . . oh God, the dragoons. Jomini said that these fellows had to be schizophrenics because one moment they had to believe that no cavalry could break their dismounted square and the next moment they had to believe that no infantry could resist their mounted charge. At the same time their semi-expendable status meant that commanders were less reluctant to put them to use, so dragoons who survived their early engagements tended to be really battle-hardened, no-nonsense soldiers. Or crazy shell-shocked bastards.


Quote:
Anyway regarding Hastings example, it doesnt seem to me like pursued infantry just randomly turned and fought off normans (if it refers to the malfosse incident), but rather it was an ambush in difficult terrain by still organized group of enemies.


So what? Disorganised pursuers would still have been greatly more vulnerable to such an ambush than a relatively well-formed body following the enemy and maintaining the pressure without losing their order.


Quote:
So to put it into context, I described it like this in line with other comments Mr. Charron made in the topic on foot vs mounted combat I posted earlier, where he argues, that mounted man would be at disadvantage against someone on foot who stay his ground. etc. etc.


Well, nobody said that you'd be burned at the stake as a heretic if you disagreed with the Charrons. Besides, mounted combat is still an unexplored area in the reconstruction of medieval martial arts (not just relatively--even in absolute terms, I don't think anyone has really experimented with it extensively), and I would wait for more work to be done upon it before drawing too many firm conclusions. Just get used to the idea that we simply don't know enough at the moment -- and, if you don't like that, why not help by doing your own practical research/experiments?


Gary Teuscher wrote:
There are both positives and negatives to pursuing a routing enemy without waiting to reform. As long as you are in contact with them, they stand almost no chance of reforming, and will take severe casualties both in the form of true casualties and also those that drop shields and weapons to get away and have their will to fight completely broken.


However, reforming a small group (perhaps the size of a conroi/troop) doesn't take much space or time, and even such a small nucleus would come in handy as a reserve to deal with stubborn defenders even if the rest of the victorious cavalry unit went on charging pell-mell. Of course this assumes that the cavalry was not deployed with a reserve line/force to begin with; in the presence of such a reserve, the foremost units can be given free rein to pursue as they liked.


Quote:
Of course, any remaining unrouted enemy can take adavantage of the pursuers, IF they manage to be able to get into a position to attack them. Fighting through your own routing forces to fight an overpursuing enemy is no easy task, though if lanes are set up for them to run through it may work. You have to be careful your own forces are to disordered and even possibly routed by your own routing troops passing through them.


Certainly; the trick of throwing fleeing troops upon their compatriots to disorder the latter is well known throughout military history, the most spectacular example being the Polish hussars pressing fleeing Swedish cavalry so hotly in one battle that the latter fell upon and disordered their own infantry, eventually leading to a rout of the Swedish wing.

Keep in mind, however, that the greatest threat to pursuers is not from the front. A man overenthusiastically pursuing routed enemies is likely to be fixated upon the fleeing foes immediately before (or around) him and thus is likely to ignore the situation beyond the immediate pursuit. This leaves him extremely vulnerable to being jumped upon from the flank or rear, and indeed the demise of most over-eager pursuers happened when they were charged or enfiladed from the flank. Needless to say, it wasn't very difficult to maneoeuvre onto the flank of overenthusiastic pursuers too busy to notice you.


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Gary Teuscher





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PostPosted: Tue 02 Oct, 2012 9:15 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Lafayette C Curtis wrote:

Quote:
However, reforming a small group (perhaps the size of a conroi/troop) doesn't take much space or time, and even such a small nucleus would come in handy as a reserve to deal with stubborn defenders even if the rest of the victorious cavalry unit went on charging pell-mell. Of course this assumes that the cavalry was not deployed with a reserve line/force to begin with; in the presence of such a reserve, the foremost units can be given free rein to pursue as they liked.


A battle like Hastings would have at this point IMO devolved into a chaotic mess, some troops forming up, others not. I'm in agreement here with you. Real war was not as precise is a miniature battle where a unit is either formed/orderly or not - there would be varying degrees likely throughout the unit, some forming up into a small conrois as you suggest, other rushing pell-mell to hack the routing troops to bits.

This is kind of the idea when the topic of cavalry vs formed close order infantry comes up. It's not as if the entire unit either decides to stay their ground and fight or the whole unit decides to route. You have various specific men of the unit doing one thing or another. The question is, do enough "break formation" to allow gaps or at least men turning from battle or even backing off to allow the cavalry charge to be sucessful.

My thought is that is a closely packed unit of men stands their ground to a man, a cavarly charge will not have much sucess. But IMO it rarely happened this way, some men of the unit would not stand their ground, except perhaps at the start of battle or certain highly trained elite units, or even those armed with great anti cavalry weapons would hold much better to a man.
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Jaroslav Kravcak




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PostPosted: Tue 02 Oct, 2012 4:51 pm    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Well to put it different way, regarding pursuers and pursued: how propable would it be that in the middle of the rout groups of men would organize themselves in orderly fashion and repel their pursuers succesfully, rather than being thrown into disorder once again themselves? (Of course excluding something like Mallfosse, where, IIRC, few overeager knights were ambushed in ferosted area and this pocket of resistance was eliminated just after some time and loss) And speaking about pursuing cavalry, wouldnt it be better to get maximum from superior speed, rather than hold together in slower pace for more security on the whole? Would cavalry pursuit or attack against disorganized enemy, or enemy in loose formation look more often like race, where they tried to get to contact as fast as possible to get use of situation, or would they huddle together at mild gallop, being afraid not to be forced to face some resisting enemy without support?

My belief is, that any situation involving chaos, even against determined, but disordered enemy suited cavalry best and that they would on the whole get much more from attacking disorganized enemy at speed, but disorder, rather than trying to preserve formation at all costs, but losing the force of impact, both psychological and physical. Or maybe to say it differently, just as square repels cavalry 99 out of 100 tries to paraphraze du Picq, so resolute and fast reacting cavalry defeats and scatter infantry not standing still in tight formation with about the same sucess. But still my actual experience is almost nonexistent in compare to someone like Bob Charron, so if I see my, from the most part theory and belief based assumtion being completely opposite, Id say its good to look into it to find out what Ive got wrong.
I was trying to find actual evidence supporting or disproving the statement, that dismounted man at arms would be much proficient fighter, while if he had at least a little bit of common sence he would be mounted only when travelling, or pursuing enemies and I still havent found anything, that would convince me, that on the whole the only time, when infantry with close combat weapons had clear advantage against cavalry was in stationary tight formation with serried ranks of bayonets, or pike points.
I hope Ill have more time and especially financial means and space to explore practicalities of mounted combat further, but for now I stick with reading about it. Happy Its really quite unexplored, maybe even some basic principles, that would be percieved as almost obvious to an ordinary cavalryman only century or so in the past and even people, that know something about it generally tend to speak cautiously about their conclusions.

Maybe its quite simplistic thinking, but why is it so often, that routed cavalry fleeing in path of their own infantry means complete rout of both? If they were theoretically able to repel enemy cavalry, why not their own? Was it almost exclusively a matter of panic connected with seeing their own cavalry being defeated that made them join the flight, or was it for actual disorder created by effors to let fleeing men pass through the formation, that enemy could exploit? (Sure it most propably, depending on situation be either of these, or combination, nevertheless, why it happened so often and there is no example of infantry standing still and compelling their fleeing horsemen to flee elsewhere, at least Im not aware of it)

There is also the notion Ive seen many times regarding napoleonic cavalry of light cavalry being more proficient in melee, because cuirassier would be mounted on bigger, slower horse. How much was this based on facts and how much on opinion? Given, that they are both skilled swordsmen and riders, how having small horse can give cavalryman some distinct advantage, if both horses are well trained as well? Or were these remarks based mostly on comparing horsemanship and swordsmanship of light and heavy cavalrymen? Would this be partly due to different training aim, light cavalry trained for individual combat and action, while heavies almost exclusively for mass charges, where individual skill wasnt regarded as too important? (Maybe analogous to training of infantry, where light infantry would receive much more marksmanship training and generally were more prone to think for themselves in action, than for example Grenadiers) To compare it to late middle ages, there is maybe an example of Stradiots against french Gendarmes and after closer look at it, it doent seem these lightly armed cavalrymen were much better, or rather not worse, than the french gendarmes, or caused them much trouble, rather they would be damaging elsewhere. But then, late middle ages man at arms was most propably multi purpouse warrior capable of taking any role on the battlefield, or in skirmishes, as situation demanded, while napoleonic cuirassier was maybe much more specialized. (But still, if they were veterans, well mounted, why should they be at any disadvantage against hussars in melee, or maybe even: why shouldnt they be at an advantage having bigger horses?)

Also, wasnt british cavalry quite sucessfull, especially lately, during Anglo-Sikh and Anglo-persian wars later in 19th century. In battles of Aliwal and Khushab they seem to manage to break infantry squares, what seem quite interesting to me is, that in both cases opening in the square, through which cavalry could then proceed was created by one of charging horsemen (loosing his life in first example and his horse in the second IIRC Happy ) So they seem to be quite well spirited and very capable by that time.

How would later training, both of cavalry and infantry influence their individual performance? I mean in times, when different bayonet fencung manuals were comming into play. These bayonet manuals quite often state in their foreword how untrained was infantry up to this point in the use of bayonet for individual defence and that it relied almost solely on battlefield experience. How true is this statement? Would level of individual skill of average soldier in handling bayonet really increase so much by introduction of these 19th c. manuals?
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Lafayette C Curtis




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PostPosted: Thu 04 Oct, 2012 6:47 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

As Yoda would say: thought too much about this, you have.

Jaroslav Kravcak wrote:
Well to put it different way, regarding pursuers and pursued: how propable would it be that in the middle of the rout groups of men would organize themselves in orderly fashion and repel their pursuers succesfully, rather than being thrown into disorder once again themselves?


It doesn't really matter; when you go into battle, you simply have to assume that it is possible, and develop your countermeasures accordingly.


Quote:
And speaking about pursuing cavalry,

(snip)

any situation involving chaos, even against determined, but disordered enemy suited cavalry best and that they would on the whole get much more from attacking disorganized enemy at speed, but disorder, rather than trying to preserve formation at all costs, but losing the force of impact, both psychological and physical.


See, this is where we get to the principle known as "tactical articulation." You don't have to choose whether to pursue pell-mell or to slow down and reorganise if you can arrange things such that part of your troops could do one while the rest did the other. This is the reason why armies are divided into units; when your squadron of cavalry is divided into several troops, for example, you can have half (or any desired proportion) of the squadrons charging out in the first line while the rest followed closely in the second line as a reserve. If the charge succeeds, you could allow the first line to pursue at speed while the second follows at a more measured pace, covering the first line's flanks and rear and ready to help them deal with any routers that might unexpectedly rally somewhere along the way (or to detach a few squadrons to help affect the course of the battle elsewhere).

So the short answer is: neither one or the other. The right way to do it is to set up your organisation beforehand so that your forces would be able to do both.


Quote:
I was trying to find actual evidence supporting or disproving the statement, that dismounted man at arms would be much proficient fighter, while if he had at least a little bit of common sence he would be mounted only when travelling, or pursuing enemies and I still havent found anything, that would convince me, that on the whole the only time, when infantry with close combat weapons had clear advantage against cavalry was in stationary tight formation with serried ranks of bayonets, or pike points.


No, there's no such easy, clear-cut principle. On one hand we have examples of cavalry tearing their way through bayonet or even pike formations; on the other hand we know of infantry that could resist cavalry solely through their high morale and solid formation without the need for long spear-like weapons. We can draw some general inferences that help inform our decision if we're leading a cavalry charge against infantry or an infantry stand against cavalry, but in the end the actual result of any given encounter must be decided on a case-by-case basis. This is endlessly repeated in cavalry manuals throughout the ages: sometimes you simply have no idea about whether you'd be able to break that particular block of infantry or not until you've actually tried.


Quote:
Maybe its quite simplistic thinking, but why is it so often, that routed cavalry fleeing in path of their own infantry means complete rout of both? Was it almost exclusively a matter of panic connected with seeing their own cavalry being defeated that made them join the flight, or was it for actual disorder created by effors to let fleeing men pass through the formation, that enemy could exploit?


Not just cavalry. Routed infantry, too, had the instinct to seek the shelter of friendly troops, but in many cases they'd disorder the receiving unit if allowed to do so. This was why Hannibal ordered his second line at Zama to level their weapons against their fleeing vanguard, and also why 19th-century infantry commanders held that it was sometimes necessary to fire and present bayonets against fleeing friendly troops that threatened the cohesion of the receiving unit in their panicked search for safety.


Quote:
If they were theoretically able to repel enemy cavalry, why not their own?


Sometimes they did! I can't remember any particular incidents off the top of my head (probably because I'm being lazy), but I'm pretty sure that a couple of hours' searching through books and memoirs would unearth at least a couple of examples.

Bu first, remember that throwing fleeing cavalry against their own infantry required the combination of several fortuitous circumstances, the most important being an insufficient interval between the routed cavalry and the infantry behind them. If there was enough space most retreating cavalrymen sensibly chose to simply get out of the way. The best ones might even be able to break off to both sides, exposing their pursuers to the fire of the infantry.


Quote:
There is also the notion Ive seen many times regarding napoleonic cavalry of light cavalry being more proficient in melee, because cuirassier would be mounted on bigger, slower horse. How much was this based on facts and how much on opinion?


We don't live in the Napoleonic age, so there's no way to know for sure. However, from the consistency by which this idea was repeated, not only among modern secondary sources but also in the writings of contemporary soldiers, I believe the distinction had at least some basis in fact.


Quote:
Given, that they are both skilled swordsmen and riders, how having small horse can give cavalryman some distinct advantage, if both horses are well trained as well? Or were these remarks based mostly on comparing horsemanship and swordsmanship of light and heavy cavalrymen? Would this be partly due to different training aim, light cavalry trained for individual combat and action, while heavies almost exclusively for mass charges, where individual skill wasnt regarded as too important?


Yes, this was apparently the case, or at least it was what contemporaries believed. And there is no reason to think that it couldn't be true; after all, in the modern world, many cavalry units are superficially equipped in a very similar way to their mechanised infantry counterparts, but their different training and organisation prepared them for very different roles. Or to cut an even finer point: the only difference between an armoured and mechanised division can be as small as the proportion of tank to infantry brigades/battalions under the division, but this proportional difference created a very real (albeit rather subtle) difference in the kinds of tasks that each type of unit is best suited to.


Quote:
But then, late middle ages man at arms was most propably multi purpouse warrior capable of taking any role on the battlefield, or in skirmishes, as situation demanded, while napoleonic cuirassier was maybe much more specialized.


That's sort of the point. The medieval or early Renaissance man-at-arms had been raised in the warlike arts since childhood, and would have had years of training (albeit not full-time) by the time they joined a fighting company as combat personnel. On the other hand, later heavy cavalry could (at least theoretically) be raised and trained from scratch, and indeed they often had to in states that had much of their traditional base of cavalry recruits driven to flee abroad (post-Revolutionary France) or had to rebuild their armies after a string of catastrophic defeats (Prussia in the later phases of the Napoleonic Wars, and even Austria to some extent--not to forget France itself during the Hundred Days).


Quote:
(But still, if they were veterans, well mounted, why should they be at any disadvantage against hussars in melee, or maybe even: why shouldnt they be at an advantage having bigger horses?)


A bigger horse could be a disadvantage in a one-on-one duel or a chaotic (if brief) melée if it wasn't bred and trained to be particularly agile. The rider, too, may lack the skill to make use of the horse's agility. It's worth noting that we rarely (if ever?) hear of 18th-century and later cuirassiers riding out between the lines to challenge an enemy champion to a duel. Such acts of bravado were largely the province of hussars and chasseurs/Jagers. This probably reflects an actual difference in the paradigm by which the various types of cavalry approached their interaction with the enemy.


Quote:
Also, wasnt british cavalry quite sucessfull, especially lately, during Anglo-Sikh and Anglo-persian wars later in 19th century. In battles of Aliwal and Khushab they seem to manage to break infantry squares, what seem quite interesting to me is, that in both cases opening in the square, through which cavalry could then proceed was created by one of charging horsemen (loosing his life in first example and his horse in the second IIRC Happy ) So they seem to be quite well spirited and very capable by that time.


It's worth noting that neither of these colonial wars lasted as long as the Napoleonic Wars, nor absorbed as much of the British Empire's resources. In the intervening years after the Napoleonic Wars the British had had the time to evaluate their prior performance and, more importantly, give their cavalry the extensive training that they could only realistically get in peacetime conditions (especially for the officers and NCOs). Taken as a whole, these factors improved the general quality and performance of the British cavalry (and in most cases their infantry too--later British infantry showed greater technical and tactical sophistication above and beyond the stubbornness they already had).

To take an example of how extensive and comprehensive peacetime training could lead to a higher level of performance, look at the British cavalry in World War I. Even when dismounted and forced to serve as infantry, they performed better than most of their plain infantry counterparts since their relative inactivity during the early groping-in-the-dark stages of trench warfare meant that they retained a far greater proportion of their pre-War officer cadre while the infantry had to make do with hastily-trained wartime officers.


Quote:
How would later training, both of cavalry and infantry influence their individual performance? I mean in times, when different bayonet fencung manuals were comming into play. These bayonet manuals quite often state in their foreword how untrained was infantry up to this point in the use of bayonet for individual defence and that it relied almost solely on battlefield experience. How true is this statement? Would level of individual skill of average soldier in handling bayonet really increase so much by introduction of these 19th c. manuals?


Unfortunately, we don't have much evidence about the individual bayonet-fencing skills of the European infantry soldier before the 19th century, so there's very little (if any) that we can know for sure. Besides, I can see the merit in the opposing argument that training soldiers too much in individual bayonet skills could be detrimental to unit performance, since it might encourage soldiers to "fence" individually rather than following unit-wide directives from the NCOs or the officers--an important issue when line infantry still fought in close formation (as opposed to the dispersed formations used by light infantry or modern infantry since World War I).
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Jaroslav Kravcak




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PostPosted: Wed 10 Oct, 2012 4:33 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Lafayette C Curtis wrote:
As Yoda would say: thought too much about this, you have.

Jaroslav Kravcak wrote:
Well to put it different way, regarding pursuers and pursued: how propable would it be that in the middle of the rout groups of men would organize themselves in orderly fashion and repel their pursuers succesfully, rather than being thrown into disorder once again themselves?


It doesn't really matter; when you go into battle, you simply have to assume that it is possible, and develop your countermeasures accordingly.


Quote:
And speaking about pursuing cavalry,

(snip)

any situation involving chaos, even against determined, but disordered enemy suited cavalry best and that they would on the whole get much more from attacking disorganized enemy at speed, but disorder, rather than trying to preserve formation at all costs, but losing the force of impact, both psychological and physical.


See, this is where we get to the principle known as "tactical articulation." You don't have to choose whether to pursue pell-mell or to slow down and reorganise if you can arrange things such that part of your troops could do one while the rest did the other. This is the reason why armies are divided into units; when your squadron of cavalry is divided into several troops, for example, you can have half (or any desired proportion) of the squadrons charging out in the first line while the rest followed closely in the second line as a reserve. If the charge succeeds, you could allow the first line to pursue at speed while the second follows at a more measured pace, covering the first line's flanks and rear and ready to help them deal with any routers that might unexpectedly rally somewhere along the way (or to detach a few squadrons to help affect the course of the battle elsewhere).

So the short answer is: neither one or the other. The right way to do it is to set up your organisation beforehand so that your forces would be able to do both.


Quote:
I was trying to find actual evidence supporting or disproving the statement, that dismounted man at arms would be much proficient fighter, while if he had at least a little bit of common sence he would be mounted only when travelling, or pursuing enemies and I still havent found anything, that would convince me, that on the whole the only time, when infantry with close combat weapons had clear advantage against cavalry was in stationary tight formation with serried ranks of bayonets, or pike points.


No, there's no such easy, clear-cut principle. On one hand we have examples of cavalry tearing their way through bayonet or even pike formations; on the other hand we know of infantry that could resist cavalry solely through their high morale and solid formation without the need for long spear-like weapons. We can draw some general inferences that help inform our decision if we're leading a cavalry charge against infantry or an infantry stand against cavalry, but in the end the actual result of any given encounter must be decided on a case-by-case basis. This is endlessly repeated in cavalry manuals throughout the ages: sometimes you simply have no idea about whether you'd be able to break that particular block of infantry or not until you've actually tried.


I fully agree with having reserves and remaining tactically flexible, I wrote it with this in mind and rather thinking about what a vanguard (if it can be called like this), that came first into contact with an enemy, managed to break him and then commenced pursuit should do, if they are properly suported and not venture too far away in their pursuit.

I also fully agree, that there are no clear cut results, it all depends on actual situation and all factors influencing it and that its allways better to try. Cavalry can retire after failed charge, while infantry is generally massacred.

Lafayette C Curtis wrote:
Quote:
But then, late middle ages man at arms was most propably multi purpouse warrior capable of taking any role on the battlefield, or in skirmishes, as situation demanded, while napoleonic cuirassier was maybe much more specialized.


That's sort of the point. The medieval or early Renaissance man-at-arms had been raised in the warlike arts since childhood, and would have had years of training (albeit not full-time) by the time they joined a fighting company as combat personnel. On the other hand, later heavy cavalry could (at least theoretically) be raised and trained from scratch, and indeed they often had to in states that had much of their traditional base of cavalry recruits driven to flee abroad (post-Revolutionary France) or had to rebuild their armies after a string of catastrophic defeats (Prussia in the later phases of the Napoleonic Wars, and even Austria to some extent--not to forget France itself during the Hundred Days).


Quote:
(But still, if they were veterans, well mounted, why should they be at any disadvantage against hussars in melee, or maybe even: why shouldnt they be at an advantage having bigger horses?)


A bigger horse could be a disadvantage in a one-on-one duel or a chaotic (if brief) melée if it wasn't bred and trained to be particularly agile. The rider, too, may lack the skill to make use of the horse's agility. It's worth noting that we rarely (if ever?) hear of 18th-century and later cuirassiers riding out between the lines to challenge an enemy champion to a duel. Such acts of bravado were largely the province of hussars and chasseurs/Jagers. This probably reflects an actual difference in the paradigm by which the various types of cavalry approached their interaction with the enemy.


But is there any inherent disadvantage in bigger horse? If he is properly trained of course. To take example from my observation people often naively think, that if they are slim, they will be much faster, than lets say a bodybuilder because he looks bulky, but there is no such a thing. Someone bigger and trained generally beats someone smaller and trained, if he is cautios and not too overconfident in most instances, at least from what Ive seen.

What about rennaisance gendarmes warhorses in compare to later ones? Like in the note of gendarmes being trained warriors from childhood, while in later days whole units would be trained from scratch, wouldnt it be similar with horses? Expensive, highly trained warhorse in rennaisance seems to be huge investment, while it seems to me most horses in napoleonic wars would be only hastily trained, if at all as riding mounts, especially after several years and huge attrition. Not to speak about any broader training in getting them used to all they could encounted at the battlefield.

Lafayette C Curtis wrote:
Unfortunately, we don't have much evidence about the individual bayonet-fencing skills of the European infantry soldier before the 19th century, so there's very little (if any) that we can know for sure. Besides, I can see the merit in the opposing argument that training soldiers too much in individual bayonet skills could be detrimental to unit performance, since it might encourage soldiers to "fence" individually rather than following unit-wide directives from the NCOs or the officers--an important issue when line infantry still fought in close formation (as opposed to the dispersed formations used by light infantry or modern infantry since World War I).


These manuals are generally written in second half of 19th century, maybe in light of foretelling of abandoning of mass formations in favour of more loose order, where individual skill would maybe play bigger role. Also maybe for light infantry even in 18th/19th century. I cant remember where is it from. but one example is the idea, that if skirmishers are caught by cavalry in the open, they should arrange in fours, defending from all sides. Would this be ever actually used and used sucessfully?
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Lafayette C Curtis




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PostPosted: Thu 11 Oct, 2012 3:40 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Jaroslav Kravcak wrote:
But is there any inherent disadvantage in bigger horse? If he is properly trained of course. To take example from my observation people often naively think, that if they are slim, they will be much faster, than lets say a bodybuilder because he looks bulky, but there is no such a thing. Someone bigger and trained generally beats someone smaller and trained, if he is cautios and not too overconfident in most instances, at least from what Ive seen.


No, there doesn't seem to be an inherent disadvantage--up to a limit. Obviously, if you rode a draft horse to battle, you'd be at a disadvantage since the draft horse isn't bred for agility. But then, even the heaviest warhorses weren't draft breeds, and were more like warmbloods or hunting horses in size and temperament, so within these limits it's not unreasonable to expect a properly trained horse to be nearly as agile as a much lighter horse. The problem, as always, is that the training of a highly skilled military horse (just like the training of a proper cavalryman) took a very long time, and this time wasn't always available to a nation/principality engaged in war (or preparing for an imminent one).


Quote:
What about rennaisance gendarmes warhorses in compare to later ones? Like in the note of gendarmes being trained warriors from childhood, while in later days whole units would be trained from scratch, wouldnt it be similar with horses?


Yes, I would expect that medieval warhorses would be generally better trained than Napoleonic cuirassiers' horses, especially considering the huge difference in price between a properly-trained warhorse (even a courser or a good rounsey) and a bottom-line riding or pack horse in the Middle Ages.

Still, it's worth noting that standards of training can vary widely within the same period; there's a notorious mid-19th century anecdote (perhaps related by Louis Nolan) about a group of Austrian officers who were stumped by a low fence and began to confer about which way they should go to find the nearest gate, upon which the one Englishman among them simply jumped his horse over the fence. This anecdote might show that the English "universal horse" paradigm meant not only that their "light" cavalry horses should be able to charge like "heavy" ones, but also that their "heavy" cavalry horses should be able to manoeuvre like their "lighter" cousins. At the same time it should warn us to be cautious about assuming a uniform standard of training among medieval and Renaissance warhorses.



Quote:
These manuals are generally written in second half of 19th century, maybe in light of foretelling of abandoning of mass formations in favour of more loose order, where individual skill would maybe play bigger role. Also maybe for light infantry even in 18th/19th century.


It's quite possible that the late 19th and early 20th centuries represented some sort of pinnacle in bayonet skills, since old soldiers in the second half of the 20th century have been known to remark about the recent simplification of bayonet drills as compared to the more extensive training they received in their days. The Japanese seemed to have been particularly good at it (with a bayonet system combining Western methods and native spear-fighting schools).



Quote:
I cant remember where is it from. but one example is the idea, that if skirmishers are caught by cavalry in the open, they should arrange in fours, defending from all sides. Would this be ever actually used and used sucessfully?


Haven't read anything like that. The ones I've seen are the "rally square" (as many skirmishers as possible pulling together into a closely-packed and more-or-less circular formation, which would preferably shake out into a proper square once the immediate threat had passed) and the "bugger off"(each skirmisher ducking for the nearest piece of cover, which need not be very large--even a small bush, boulder, or ditch would force an incoming cavalrymen to slow down or circle around and give the skirmisher more time to shoot or spring out with the bayonet).
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Jaroslav Kravcak




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PostPosted: Thu 11 Oct, 2012 6:58 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Lafayette C Curtis wrote:
No, there doesn't seem to be an inherent disadvantage--up to a limit. Obviously, if you rode a draft horse to battle, you'd be at a disadvantage since the draft horse isn't bred for agility. But then, even the heaviest warhorses weren't draft breeds, and were more like warmbloods or hunting horses in size and temperament, so within these limits it's not unreasonable to expect a properly trained horse to be nearly as agile as a much lighter horse. The problem, as always, is that the training of a highly skilled military horse (just like the training of a proper cavalryman) took a very long time, and this time wasn't always available to a nation/principality engaged in war (or preparing for an imminent one).


Regarding example of draft horse, does it nessesarily have to be BRED for agility? What about it being TRAINED for agility, even if its a draft horse? I dont know much about training horses, less so about training horses for war, but is there really any provable fact supporting, that draft horse couldnt make as good or better warhorse for gendarme, than maybe one of medium size with more ideal body proportions? (Of course supposing there was enough time to train him properly)
Or was it only matter of some horses learning faster, so being more looked for? But even here: would intelligence to learn be in any direct relation to horse breed, or size?

Lafayette C Curtis wrote:
Yes, I would expect that medieval warhorses would be generally better trained than Napoleonic cuirassiers' horses, especially considering the huge difference in price between a properly-trained warhorse (even a courser or a good rounsey) and a bottom-line riding or pack horse in the Middle Ages.

Still, it's worth noting that standards of training can vary widely within the same period; there's a notorious mid-19th century anecdote (perhaps related by Louis Nolan) about a group of Austrian officers who were stumped by a low fence and began to confer about which way they should go to find the nearest gate, upon which the one Englishman among them simply jumped his horse over the fence. This anecdote might show that the English "universal horse" paradigm meant not only that their "light" cavalry horses should be able to charge like "heavy" ones, but also that their "heavy" cavalry horses should be able to manoeuvre like their "lighter" cousins. At the same time it should warn us to be cautious about assuming a uniform standard of training among medieval and Renaissance warhorses.


Interesting quote indeed. Happy How could different types of cavalry be compared in this light: for example parthian cataphract, french renaisance gendarme and napoleonic cuirassier. Id say the latter was viewed as heavy cavalryman mostly, whose sole purpouse was to charge enemy in mass without too much emphasis on other skills. On the other hand, both gendarme and his horse seem to be much more maneuverable, flexible and well trained both as individual fighting unit, if it was nessesary to act on their own, but also cooperating with others in formation for huge variety of different tasks in time they were at their peak.
But what about cataphracts? Were they really just clumsy monsters that would need to take breath after they charged for a little, being so hugely tired as not being able to chase routed enemy, like at Magnesia? Or being outclassed by clubwielding palestinians in situation, where they almost won? Im not that much into ancient warfare, but my view is, everyone exaggerates numbers and importance of unimportant occurences in history, the problem with these sources several thousand year old, in comare to late middle ages, rennaisance and further is, that besides written beletry any actual verification of numbers of men involved and casualties is much harder, most research relying on guesswork and written accounts in chronicles in this matter.
Could it be, that they were also as multipurpouse warriors as later gendarmes, though maybe less glorified and more condemned? I mostly see history written from roman perspective, while I dont know much about how partians themselves viewed these forces of their own, regarding their actual effectiveness.

Lafayette C Curtis wrote:
Haven't read anything like that. The ones I've seen are the "rally square" (as many skirmishers as possible pulling together into a closely-packed and more-or-less circular formation, which would preferably shake out into a proper square once the immediate threat had passed) and the "bugger off"(each skirmisher ducking for the nearest piece of cover, which need not be very large--even a small bush, boulder, or ditch would force an incoming cavalrymen to slow down or circle around and give the skirmisher more time to shoot or spring out with the bayonet).


My shot was it is from du Picq in his paragraph about skirmishers, but there is no such a thing, so maybe Im just making things up, or I misinterpreted his other remarks.

But he once again is someone greatly degrading cavalryman in single combat. Laughing Out Loud

To quote:
- Cavalry always fights very poorly and very little. This has been true from antiquity, when the cavalryman was of a superior caste to the infantryman, and ought to have been braver.
-From ancient days the lone infantryman has always had the advantage over the lone cavalryman. There is no shadow of a doubt about this in ancient narrations. The cavalryman only fought the cavalryman. He threatened, harassed, troubled the infantryman in the rear, but he did not fight him. He slaughtered him when put to flight by other infantry, or at least he scattered him and the light infantry slaughtered him.

He was military officer IIRC, but did he ever saw actual cavalrymen in action? Or are these just theorethical assumptions. There are many 19th century publications regarding military of the past available for free on the internet, but I dont like these too much, as they many times cite quotes, that are nowhere to find, most propably to make their point, many times exaggerating it too much, or plainly confabulating.
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Gary Teuscher





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PostPosted: Thu 11 Oct, 2012 9:13 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Quote:
Regarding example of draft horse, does it nessesarily have to be BRED for agility? What about it being TRAINED for agility, even if its a draft horse? I dont know much about training horses, less so about training horses for war, but is there really any provable fact supporting, that draft horse couldnt make as good or better warhorse for gendarme, than maybe one of medium size with more ideal body proportions?


I don't have any personal experience training horses either. But throughout history, the best way to make a European horse "better" for war was to introduce hot blood stock, usually arabic or a strain of arabic.

I think this stems from the two types of horses even before being domesticated. The European horses were "forest" type horses, thicker, apparently broader feet (hooves), and came from millions of years of living in a more forested enviroment.

On the other hand, the "Hot bloods" were from the plains, and had denser bones, lighter build, could actually carry more for their weight because of a shorter back (IIRC Arabians have one less vertabrae even).

Because of this distinct difference, hot bloods made better warhorses. Pretty well all of the traditional later european warhorses had some degree of hot blood in them, mixed with native stock, which made them "warmbloods".

As to the actual agility and how trainable the horses were I do not know - but there seems to be a distinct difference between hot bloods, warm bloods and cold bloods as far as a desirability as a warhorse, so you would think there would be a difference in performance as well.

For examples of "Hot Bloods" you can look at the Akhal Teke, the Barb, and of course the Arabian. Warm Bloods include the Baroque horses of the renaissance (not sure if there are any surviving breeds), the Lippizzaner is an example, and the Adalusian, though I think the Andalusian tends more towards the hot blood end of things.

Think about this - would you race a draft horse against a quarterhorse or thoroughbred? I would not put any money on the draft. And both the thoroughbred and quarterhorse have a fair amount of hot blood in them, the thoroughbred a mixture of English horses and Barbs, Akhal Teke and Arab. The Quarterhorse is a thoroughbred mixed with indian breeds, who were descended from the Adalusian/Barb/Arabic mix of the Spaniard Conquistadors.

Another thing - the huge drafts we have now did not exist in the Middle Ages or Renaissance - these were bred for size for draftwork in the last few centuries. So putting a knight on a 2000+ pound Clydesdale was not even an option.
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