[Zac Evans]

If I can just throw in some information here. This past year I took part in a re-enactment of the battle of Bosworth, with the group Destrier, acting as bodyguard of King Richard. This involved doing one of the most fun things I've ever done, which is charging across Bosworth field on a horse in full harness, and delivering a lance upon a shield.

We rode our horses at a collected canter for about 20-30 meters, and delivered balsa tipped lances against pavises held by infantry. The first day I struck the pavise at an angle close to 90 degrees. Although fully braced, and only using a balsa tip the lance was ripped out of my hand and threw the foot soldier onto their back. My companion pulled his shot, breaking the lance but not throwing the soldier.

On day two, I struck at an acute angle, which broke the lance, but the force of the charge was not transferred fully to the soldier. My companion struck true, shattering his lance, throwing the soldier off their feet and breaking the pavise. This was also at a (fast) collected canter.

I believe if we had used sharp hardwood lances, the pavises and armour would have been no protection at all. I think this shows how powerful a lance strike can be, and why cavalry were feared by infantry when they were in loose formation.

The way I see it, both in the large scheme of battle, and the minutae of a lance charge, the main job of cavalry is to apply overwhelming force to a single point. Their speed allows them to do this effectively, but once they loose that advantage, they suddenly become expensive, easily outnumbered foot troops.


Picture courtesy of Pat Patrick. This is the press after the initial charge. I am on the far left.

[Randall Moffett]

Gary,

Regarding pikemen.... yep. Seems to be largely why they were developed. Halbards and the likes worked fine for infantry it was cavalry that for which these beasts really came into there own. That said there are dozens, scores perhaps even hundreds of frontal charges against infantry that succeed for one reason or another, though not often again pikemen largely. It was such a valid option throughout the HYW we see it often come up in execution or planning as a possible tactic. Since pikes were really not a major factor in most armies of medieval Europe till the 2nd half of the 15th I do not think it should be a crucial part of success of the cavalry charge against infantry. Of course going back to my earlier statement, we see infantry armed with all sorts of arms that withstand cavalry at times for whatever reason.

With the Falkirk example we have to be careful as the archers surely help cut the Shiltron's down but the various other issues facing them must have had a huge detriment to Scottish moral.

Len,

Neat link BTW. Cliff Rogers gave a very interesting lecture on successful cavalry charges back in York 2006 and as those who know Cliff he included more references than I could write down. From what I can find it still is not published sadly.

RPM

[Bjorn Hagstrom]

[Joakim Løvgren]

[Luka Borscak]

[quote="Joakim Løvgren"]

[Randall Moffett]

Luka,

I think you are right. The French plan was likely created by one of the best tacticians the French had available. He certainly would not have sent them to certain death, especially if it were without purpose. Seemingly the small numbers of men who joined (perhaps because fighting the archers was not glamorous) and then the use of pikes, which Gesta Henrici indicates is a relatively new thing for the English spelled doom. That said it may be that the small cavalry forces did feel they would fail as they had to know that the bulk of their numbers were no shows.

Anne Curry's new book on Agincourt has some good ideas about this for those interested.


RPM

[Brian Robson]

Any thoughts to relating to the likelyhood of the infantry simply running away?

I'm thinking in terms of those periods where heavy cavalry really was the supreme force (ie 13c - before the start of the decline with Stirling, Courtrai etc.). I know that the infantry weapons used are often heralded as a big deciding factor here - but what happened before then?
Is it reasonable to assume that most professional/disciplined/experienced troops of the time would have been mounted - leaving the bulk of the infantry as badly-equipped first-timers?

If you bear that in mind and look at any modern footage of riots etc. you often see the police lines doing either full or feigned charges. In almost every instance, the crowd runs away. Doesn't matter if the crowd are violent, throwing bricks with their adrenaline up and mates next to them. they run.
To me, it doesn't seem too difficult to imagine what a line of poor-quality troops would do vs charging heavy cavalry. I'd imagine that in most cases the line broke before the cavalry got there, and the first 'hit' would happen while chasing down routing troops.

I just wonder if it's the simple act of infantry fleeing that makes cavalry charges succeed, but standing together and holding their ground is the main factor that makes it fail? Psychological warfare.

[Rusty Thomas]

[Gary Teuscher]

[Gary Teuscher]

Forgot to say, interesting info on the Templars, Len!

[Lafayette C Curtis]

[Brian Robson]

[Gary Teuscher]

[Lafayette C Curtis]

Such things only happened in major battles, however, which were a rarity. Most medieval armies and battles were quite small--by modern standards, they'd be more accurately called "detachments" and "skirmishes"--and the extent of ground they were fought over were usually small enough that defeat at any point usually led to the rest of the force being "rolled up" and routed as well. It's worth noting that in the same campaign--the Albigensian Crusades--the colossal victory at Muret was won by less than a thousand horsemen!

[Gary Teuscher]

[Randall Moffett]

There are some very interesting accounts that show this dynamic of cavalry verses infantry. On is the days leading up to Arsuf in 1191. Of the half a dozen excellent accounts on this three (two crusader and one Arab source, Saladin's secretary nonetheless) indicates the heavy Mamluks actually push through the heavy crusader infantry until the rearguard of the crusader cavalry plunges into them. In this case it is hard to claim these infantry were poorly armed, organized or disciplined as for several more days they would repel the Muslims until the actual battle broke out. In this case the enemy cavalry was just more so.

Another is Nicopolis. The European knights and heavy cavalry tore through a screen of pits and stakes then crushed the Muslim infantry. Sure they were largely volunteer or drafted men but most of the accounts indicate they stood their ground and were subsequently cut down, then routed. If not for the mounted Ottoman cavalry fresh waiting and French stupidity in not reforming and waiting for the rest of the army (Hey I bet Coucy would agree) the battle might have been much different. Regardless heavy cavalry could do a heck of lot of damage to static forces and be victorious over them.

Now I selected these two accounts for two reasons. First to show that in some cases even with infantry forces that are not cowed and broken before the charges impact stood and failed and two because they are good example of how one action does not always mean victory. In these cases the forces lacked their infantry forces to finish the attack. Some people have taken the Mamluk attack as not more than a feint but Saladin's won secretary does not seem to think this.


Gary,

Clearly there are few battles that are won by any single action or group, even into the modern period cohesion between various groups, individuals and tools are vital to victory. Yet the individual or their smaller units are imperative to the outcome often.

I am not much a Brady fan but it would be wrong to say he won but equally wrong that he did not have a key role in taking the game. Every team needs its Saladin's or Richard's, and seemingly their Philip d' Eu's. At least John learns a valuable lesson from his impatience.

RPM

[Gary Teuscher]

[Randall Moffett]

If Richard I's infantry were not some of the best of the best I'd be surprised as they are one of the most commonly held groups for the effective use of infantry during the medieval period, perhaps even more so than the Varangians. Arsuf is likely one of the best known battles in infantry repelling cavalry, which for almost the entire event is true but as I said before even the best infantry is not guaranteed victory against a direct cavalry attack. If you have not looked at the battle it is certainly worth a look.

Now there is some point where the Norman knights under Robert rides down the Varangians but I could not tell you the specific battle, either Corfu or Dyrrhachium I think where the guards are defeated under Alexius I. They were separated from the rest of the Byzantine army but when attacked draw into ranks but do not hold. The rest of the Byzantine infantry does not do very well either, a direct charge pushing right through the center. I think this account is covered in good detail in the Alexiad (written by His daughter Anna).

John Keegan puts casualties at only a few percent in many cases. But since any group can break this is not crucial to the infantry to cavalry issue as much as general wafare. Cavalry, infantry, missilemen, for the most part breaking to flee seems to be applicable to any one, though it is easier on a horse in many cases.

RPM

[Gary Teuscher]

[Randall Moffett]

Where are you seeing that they were flanked? Separated by the rest of the army, sure. Tired, yep. Every thing I have seen indicates they regroup and the knights hit them in front. Regardless of if they are tired it still worked. If we simply list reasons why infantry were unable to stand against cavalry charges it obscures the real issue, that cavalry charges often were successful and not only because they (the infantry) ran before the charge hit This is the main issue. They stood ground to meet the offensive and it failed.

Same goes with the main Byzantine army of infantry. They get the charge front and center and fail. Now they are not perhaps the best infantry in the world but they are certainly what is constantly portrayed often as rag tag, ill disciplined infantry who broke and rank before they impact but they held then are defeated.

To me this is the key point. We have dozens, scores, maybe hundreds of accounts that are not wimpy, unprepared and ill disciplined groups of infantry being defeated by cavalry charges. We see pike formations in the 15th and 16th where heavy cavalry do similar things. We can try making a list of reasons (excuses) it failed to hold without fleeing before the initial impact, but it did. To me there is enough evidence this was looked at as a primary tactic not an accidental one, were they always effective? No of course not. Most of the time? Not likely but how many times do we read of missile assaults failing, infantry attacks being held off, all the time. Why should we expect the cavalry charge to be any different, battle is scores of factors moving like a blur and any number of them can effect the out come but we have to be wary of simply making this into a straight across causal relationship and such generalities usually are to broad to be accurate.

Doubtless the better armed, better prepared and disciplined infantry was more likely to hold but from what I have seen invincible is a stretch.

RPM