I'm mulling over the use of reserve troops in pre-gunpowder warfare. Robert the Bruce held a small force of mounted men at arms at the battle of Bannockburn, which I believe stopped the Edwards's only real flanking manouvre (I may be mistaken here) at that battle.

Are there any more shining examples of strategic reserves (especially light troops or even levys) winning major battles? I'd love to hear about them. In most cases it seems like reserves are far less dependable troops who quit the field before they are of any use, but I don't have any concrete examples to back this up.

Maybe the first battle of Ramleh ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ramla ). After first two divisions of Baldwin's army were broken, the third division was routed but it turned and broke the Egyptians.

In the Roman Republic, the reserve was formed by the triarii, grizzled veterans all. If the younger hastati and principes couldn't win, they'd filter back to the rear, then the triarii would close ranks. Whether they were ordered to advance, hold, or retreat depended on how things were going!

At the battle of Cynocephalae in the 2nd century BC, a Macedonian phalanx was coming downhill at the Romans. On the right side the phalanx pushed the Romans right down the hill like a bulldozer, but on the left the Romans managed to hit the Macedonians before they were fully formed, and drove them back up the hill. A Roman tribune in that section of the line looked back and saw the Macedonians advancing past him on his right, so he peeled off 30 maniples of triarii from his own line and hit the enemy in the rear. The result was a slaughter. Many of the Macedonians tried to surrender by raising their pikes to vertical, but the Romans didn't understand and chopped them up anyway.

I think there are a few examples of the good use of good reserves in Caesar's wars, too, but it's been too long since I read all that! The triarii no longer existed by his day, but most decent Roman commanders understood the use of reserves. Even if they didn't, reserves were kind of built into their typical arrangement of 2 or 3 battle lines.

Matthew

Hmmm... I think I know one more:

In the battle of the Marchfeld ( also called the battle of Dürnkut and Jedenspeigen ) in 1278, Rudolf I of Habsburg hid back 60 knights in a vineyard, to attack at the most crucial moment, even thought such a tactic was considered dishonorable at that time.
Their attack on the exhausted knights of Ottokar II of Bohemia broke the bohemian knights who were exhausted from three hours of fighting in heavy armour.

60 knights? that's a tiny force - do you know the overall numbers on the field?

The battle of kadesh: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kadesh

Quote from the above:

" Meanwhile a small group of Egyptian chariotry had formed, made up of Ramesses, his personal bodyguard and some of the chariots recovered from the broken divisions of Amon and Re. At this time a troop contingent from Amurru called Ne'arin, suddenly arrived, surprising the Hittites. Ramesses reorganized his forces and drove the Hittites back across the Orontes. Muwatalli sent an additional 1,000 chariots against the Egyptians, but the Hittite forces were almost surrounded and retreated back across the Orontes River to join their infantry. "

The main problem with early reserves is command and controll. You depend on very competent reserve commanders for them to work very efficiently.

This said, as the above example shows, even a small reserve can make a huge difference.

Although gunpowder era, a glorious example of a good reserve commander is at the Battle of Zorndorf, where Lt. General von Seydlitz commanded the prussian cavalry reserves on the left flank.
Due to a miscoordinated attack by the infantry, the prussian left flank was crumbling, and King Fredrick II (aka the great) sent repeated, increasingly heated orders to Seydlitz, ordering a counterattack, which he completely ignored.
(As it turned out, the terrain in front of Seydlitz's position did not allow for a cavalry charge, which the king did not know)
When the king's messager threatened with court martial and untimely decapitation, Seydlitz replied "Tell the king that he can have my head when the battle is over. For now, I will use it in his service."
After which, as the flank of the advancing enemy passed the obstacle, he ordered his squadrons on a charge that crushed the entire advancing russian force, horse and foot, and turned the flank all the way back to the russian batteries.
Needless to say, he kept his head.

Every night my wife calls in the Daddy reserve to fight the kid to bed.... :lol:

Both mine are rather borderline I think. One is secret reserve like in Risk the second treachery.

Battle of Tagliacozzo in 1268. Conradin Hohenstaufen verse Charles of Anjou. Charles of anjou sits back with a large mounted force of reserve hidden some way behind hte main army. After the battle seemed decided and both armies had been severely worn down Charles rides out and wipes the enemy force out causing them to flee. Conradin flees but is later caught and beheaded.

Depending if you think as M. Jones does, which I do not, Bosworth in 1485 could be such a battle. Though the reserve in this was originally on the opposite side.

Richard supposedly according to Virgil had some 10k men but a large percent of the troops were under Lord Stanley who did not join in the battle but seems to have spectated for some time (likely to hedge his bets with the victor). Once Richard III's charge failed or lost steam Stanley joins in to basically trounce what is left of Richard's army. By this point it may be that Richard III was dead but his army certainly could hve swung the battle.


RPM

Ah, thanks Lin, you've jogged my memory. The horse cancelled out the archers. I can only imagine a hail of arrows would spell rapid demise for a schiltron.

I hadn't heard about the baggage train "sallying" to join the route, but that's kind of an amusing image, especially with the bedsheets. It seems a keen sense of carpe diem had a lot to do with the Scottish victory as well.

From the examples thus far it seems that command and control would have to be left to a very competent leutenant; someone who would be wise enough (or seasoned enough) to avoid commiting the reserve to late, too early, or in the wrong place.

Heavy cavalry would be a natural coup de grâce, plus they have the manourve advantage to sweep the rear once they penetrate. Infantry (from what I've seen and read) is often undone by overadvancing and exposing a flank unwittingly, whereas mounted troops can get by and keep going to minimize the danger. Does that sound about right?

The Battle of Dreux in 1562, where in the Duc de Guise held the Catholic/Royalist reserve behind a village while the Huguenot Horse under the Prince of Condé wore itself out on fruitless charges against the King's Swiss. Guise is credited with winning that battle for the Marshall Anne de Montmorency by that action. Interestingly enough, both Condé and Montmorency (the opposing commanders in the battle) managed to get themselves captured in the course of the battle, a rather unusual turn of events, needless to say. For a brief description of the battle, go here: http://www.lepg.org/dreux.htm

Cheers!

Gordon

Lin,

From what I could tell unless the Templars were in the pickets of spears they were not there. The rewards after Bannockburn can give an idea of the nobles and other landed men there. Two of my family back in that day earned a fair deal of lands for leading about 10 percent of the 500 horsemen who were there (yes I had to tell you this, sorry). I have always thought the victory was less due to Edward II being completely inept than Bruce knew how to exploit a weaker military mind than his. With Edward I he has less room to move and had to tred carefully. With Edward II the politics of how he ran the country might be just as responsible for his losses and Bruce was then free to gain what he needed. Bruce was a good tactician I think; Preparation of the field, arraying men with proper skills to neutralize the cavalry and archers, smart man. I do remember the story of the baggage train. Does not Barbour call them the small people?

RPM

Yes, I mean tactical reserves, pre-rennaisance. Specifically lightly armed or levy troops.

The way I've heard the story of Bannockburn, is that the battle ended when the Bruce committed a reserve of Highlanders. The Highlanders were considered undisciplined, and prone to charge without orders, or overextend themselves. As such, he kept there too far back to do any harm until his reliable troops were all engaged, and even growing tired. Then he orders the Highlanders into the battle, and seeing fresh and eager troops joining the Scots, the English retreated.... or ran like the blazes.