Daniel Staberg wrote: | ||
There is indeed terrain which is equaly difficult for both cavalry and infantry but in other cases horses have a lot more trouble because of their weight combined with having four legs and the way their hooves handle certain types of terrain. Particularly when acting as a unit that depends on momentum (ii.e the cavalry charge) to be effective in combat. 16th &17th military writers such as Basta, Monteccucoli and Melzo all recognised that lancers needed flat and firm ground to deliver their charge effectivly. Pistol armed cuirassiers could be effectiv on more diffcult ground but still got into the same problem as the lancers when encountering trees and ditches. The battle of Pavia is a good example of how terrain could be very difficult for cavalry while not impeding the ability of the infantry to fight against the cavalry. (Rather the opposit) The French Gendarmes found themselves with serious problems among the ditches, hedges and trees of the park while the Spanish and Landsknecht arquebusiers and pikemen were able to fully exploit the terrain to their advantage. Another example is snow, during the battle of Uppsala (1520) an army of Swedish yeomen and peasants attacked a Danish force (including a large number of mercenaries as well as some pro-danish Swedes). The snow that fell during the battle gave the Swedes an advantage since the wet and heavy snow not only made firearms and artillery ineffective but it also cause sever problems for the Danish cavalry. The snow gathered in large clumps under the hooves of the horses "and soon both horse and man lay on the ground" to quote an eyewitness. The Swedes who fought on foot and relied on crossbows rather than firearms had no such problems and inflicted severe losses on the Danes. At Morgarten the key terrain features was the slopes covered with woods on one side of the path and the marshy area around the stream and along the sea shore which restricted the ducal army to the path. [ Linked Image ] shows a small part of the middle of the battlefield around the so called Letziturm. Despite later day alterations you can still get an idea of the shape of slopes as well as of how dense the woods can get. Not cavalry terrain at all. [ Linked Image ] http://www.morgarten.ch/bilder/Karte%20schlachtweg.jpg The difficult terrain meant that the Leopold's troops could not use their superior numbers to outflank the roadblock that the Swiss had established at Schafstetten. Instead the army was forced to halt while attempts were made to storm the Swiss position. At the same time poor tactical discipline caused the ducal troops to bunch together on the path which limited their ability to move and fight if attacked even more. When the Swiss charged down the slopes they achived almost complete surprise which was followed up with a hail of stone that injured men and horses as well as causing even more disorder in the ducal ranks. And from disorder it is only a small step to panic, particularly when there is no space to move or fight properly while your enemy has cut of your reinforcements and only line of retreat by dropping logs over the path. The Swiss had effectivly used terrain and suprise to render all the advantages of the ducal army useless, the collapse and rout of the ducal troops ensure the Swiss victory. Now the terrain at Morgarten was far from easy for infantry, one of the first accounts of the battle describe how the Swiss wore special "irons" to gain a sure footing on the slopes. Like the peasants of Ditmarschen they had the skills and equipment to use their native terrain to full advantage. Without it the battle may well have been much harder for the Swiss. |
Thank you for the scetches and the description. :) One more question, that would be interesting: Were Austrians actually ready to face serious resistance at this location? (Or, in another words, were they marching fully ready for battle, in full armour and lances, ready to form up and deliver charge, cautious of potential enemy presence, or with some clear cut plan on what to do, if ambushed, or would they rather march without much caution, maybe similat to the situation of Burgundians at the battle of Morat, where the bulk of the army wouldnt be fully battle-ready at the critical moment.)
Regarding the battle of Pavia, it still reamins quite unclear to me, what was the scale of this defeat for french gendarmes. Were hommes d'armes singled out without their supporting archers and coustiliers, or would almost whole force of about 4000 cavalrymen be surrounded by imperialist army? Would whole gendarmerie be involved, or would most of them escape and only a handfull of most notable noblemen around the king be massacred? What was their condition, when they routed De Lannoys cavalry - have they regrouped for another charge, or did they continued to pursue the enemy? Were they maybe compelled to continue their charge forward by being already put under fire? Have they charged in in any orderly manner, or in smaller groups? In what state were they before supporting Landsknechts arrived to help spanish? (or in another words, what role would close combat weapons play in eliminating french cavalry, werent they mostly broken by that time?)
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Regarding mentioned high status noblemen vs humble footmen, I find it very overstated. Sure it was a loss, if well trained warhorse, or knight, or both were killed, nevertheless in pure resource terms, they werent that hard to replace. There were plenty of noblemen around, at least at this stage (regarding 16th century french and their gendarmerie.), even with all the losses, there were still many more to be involved in ordonance companies in french wars of religion, that followed after italian wars. Id say it was about the same for Burgundians before. As for horses, in monetary terms, it was a great loss, but given their lifespan, they were in theory even more easily replaced, than warriors they carried. On the other hand, men in elite infantry units might have been much cheaper to equip and easier to train, nevertheless, they needed much time and experience before actually becomming perfectly working invulnerable automatons and loosing significant numbers of these experiences soldiers would be as hard to replace, if not harder, than nobles. Also, if they werent pure mercenaries, loss of these men also meant loss of economic potential. (James B. Woods in his book The King's Army: Warfare, Soldiers and Society During the Wars of Religion gives average age of french noble cavalrymen involved to be still in their teens, while infantrymen were generally in their 30s-40s for example, this might speak about the average age for seasoned infantry at the peak of their performance, while for cavalry, these were mostly young noblemen, well trained for war, but going in without that much theoretical experince in actual combat, but still be reasonably good to do the job expected from them.) Also, many times losses of french gendarmerie in battles of italian wars are hard to even estimate, on the other hand it was considered unbearable, when some 800 noblemen fell on both sides at the battle of Dreux, so that both sides tryed to spare their nobility afterwards. (At least in theory), so its dubious for me, that french would be losing many hundreds of hommes d'armes per battle.
Regarding battle of Omdurman and charge of 21st lancers, good book specifically aimed at this episode of the battle Id recommend is The last charge: the 21st Lancers and the Battle of Omdurman. Its full of eye witness account. Nevertheless, I have never seen any description of it, that wouldnt agree, that they fell into trap set up by INFANTRY. There are some enemy cavalrymen mentioned in description, but otherwise, this simply doesnt fit in. For the most part this was indeed a trap, there were troops kneeling concealed in sunken riverbed and middle squadrons basically jumped straight into 12 lines of men presenting their spear straight up. (its still remarkable, that only 20 men died and 50 were heavily wounded in such a situation, basically most of killed were the ones, that were dismounted after hitting ground after jump and werent able to get up and dead were almost exclusively from 2 middle squadrons, while there were only few wounded at the wings, where terrain was better and enemy only 4 lines deep. Theres also a numbers of 120 horses lost, but this by itself would be the whole loss for the campaign, or some period of it, not for this action. Its really dubious, given, that anyone, who wasnt able to remount and ride through was as good as dead and there are only very few men in anecdotes, that escaped alive on foot, or were helped by other rider. Also, horses of killed riders might not have all been killed, but captured, if rider fell off, why would someone kill riderless horse in the middle of the fight? So I firmly believe, theres no reason for higher theoretical immediate casualties of horses than about 20.)