Lafayette C Curtis wrote: |
Um...Plutarch himself? :) To get a good picture of what happened at Carrhae, we can't just focus all of our attention upon that single chapter with its dramatic description of the arrow storm and its alleged effects upon the Roman legionaries. The single largest loss of the day was the annihilation of Publius Crassus's detachment away from the main army; Plutarch says that this detachment consisted of 1300 horsemen, eight cohorts, and 500 archers, so it must have numbered over 5000 soldiers in total even if we take account of the possibility that the legionary cohorts might have been understrength from attrition and desertion and all. Compare this to the number of wounded men that Crassus had to leave in camp later during the night as he made a hurried retreat along with the rest of the army: a mere 4000 men. It would not be unreasonable to assume that these 4000 men would have been all (or nearly all) the casualties Crassus's army would have suffered in the battle itself if it hadn't been for the greater and morally more significant loss of Publius and his detachment. 4000 might have been a fairly heavy loss for an army of 40,000 but I daresay that, without Publius's detachment and its disastrous defeat, this 10% loss would not have been crippling to (Marcus) Crassus's army! (In fact, if we tally the losses mentioned by Plutarch, we find that the majority was due to the annihilation of small detachments that straggled away from the main body, either during the hurried march to Carrhae (such as Vargontinus and his four cohorts) or as the army disintegrated after Crassus was lured into a trap and murdered. The 4000 men lost during the day's fighting pales in comparison to these). Another issue is that we don't have Parthian sources for this battle. If any of them had survived (and been translated for our study), I believe they would have mourned the heavy losses they incurred as the price for this victory, particularly during the desperate fighting with Publius Crassus and his cornered detachment. In other words, the heavy casualties probably went both ways, albeit much heavier for the Romans than for the Parthians. |
If my memory serves me Surena was later persecuted, maybe lack of parthian sources indicates intentioned erasing of accounts of his exploits, or existence.
Lafayette C Curtis wrote: |
I normally would deny the idea that cavalry went into a "decline" at the end of the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance but, truth be told, this is one of the few things that actually do make a case for such a decline. Medieval men-at-arms were (generally speaking) a versatile elite force able to fight as heavy cavalry, light cavalry, or heavy infantry as needed. As other troops took over the infantry and light cavalry roles, however, the gens d'armes appear to have become more confined and stereotyped into the heavy cavalry role, losing much of their original flexibility in the process. Of course, this was a very gradual process; in the 1460s and 70s the hommes d'armes were still a multirole force, and even their heavy cavalry actions often involved a great deal of manoeuvre (with sometimes hilarious results, such as the mess at Montlhery). Even the Burgundian ordinances of the 1470s still stipulated that their men-at-arms ought to be able to fight dismounted if necessary. In contrast, while 16th-century men-at-arms could theoretically dismount, it seems that in practice they no longer expected to be regularly ordered to do so. On the other hand, I have to wonder if the image you get of inflexibility is heavily coloured by the bias in your reading towards major battles and large formations. Montluc in his memoirs relates a number of smaller engagements where the shock cavalry on the French side (though not necessarily gendarmes) were able to conduct flanking manoeuvres, regroup after an attack, and the like. The cavalry in these "small wars" also frequently participated in raids and expeditions, some of which required them to dismount in order to join the friendly forces scaling a town wall or something like that. And of course let's not forget Bayard's lightning raid in 1515, which netted none less than Prospero Colonna himself! |
Loyal serviteur mentiones also some other skirmishises in which Bayard took place - like one against Stradiots. It also mentiones french men at arms dismouting and storming enemy barricades with their lances on foot and other examples. I was rather persuaded that they were multi puspouse warriors well into the first quarter of 16th century at least. And even then to teh degree. What about for example nobleman serving as english light dragoon trooper during napoleonic wars? - wouldnt he receive extensive training and be competent swordman, horseman and even marksman at once, and generally quite well educated, so he could serve any role needed as well?
Lafayette C Curtis wrote: |
Administratively neater, yes. But in terms of military practice the Ordonnances were probably just a formalisation of the structures and methods that had become gradually established among the better elements of the French royal forces during the final phase of the Hundred Years' War. The royal Ordonnance did not spring out of a vacuum either; there were a number of ordinances of a more local nature enacted in the preceding decades. The impact of the royal Ordonnance (and the companies (re)organised under its aegis) largely lay in the fact that this time it was the French king doing it with all the resources of the royal administration (and exchequer!) behind him, thus achieving more far-reaching and longer-lasting effects than the previous ducal and comital ordinances.
(As an aside, De Re Militari (the research group) used to have Brian Ditcham's dissertation on foreign mercenaries in French service in the era straddling the promulgation of the Ordinances, but it seems to be gone now due to a malware attack on their site. Which is too bad since it's a really valuable resource, particularly in showing some of the continuities between the Compagnies d'Ordonnance and earlier practice.) Not quite true. Charlemagne (or even one of his immediate predecessors) appear to have established royal scarae as some sort of small standing component serving as a mobile reserve that didn't have to be raised anew for each and every campaign. The military Orders of the Crusades were essentially quasi-independent standing armies. Henry II and Richard I of England also made much use of long-service mercenaries who partook of the character of standing armies while their reigns lasted. Simply said, "the first standing army since Roman times" is pretty much a meaningless epithet since it can be assigned to any number of the better-organised military institutions in the era depending on how we define "standing army." |
Im quite lacking perspective from earlier times. I dont know where exactly Ive read it, but it was explained that these ordonnances instituted cavalry companies that wold generally train together and be payed and loyal to the french king immediatly, with him having full power over commisioning commanders et. Good information on the earliest days of ordonnaces seems to be scarce - generally it only mentions first ordonnance being issued in 1445, though Ive seen vague statements of them being issued even earlier, but I dont know any further details. Charles the Bolds ordonnaces seem are accesible in bigger detail, at lest from internet sources. (I mean their exact form, like what was presribed salaries etc.)